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This dissertation will explore some of the reasons why poetry is ranked as 
the highest    of all the arts in Kant’s aesthetics and what is the relation 
between nature and poetry. The central thesis is that poetry is the most 
beautiful art because it is made of language. It will be shown that poetry 
possesses free beauty and that pure judgments of taste in poetry are possible. 
Besides, poetry is the only art that originates entirely from the genius, 
because it shares the same language of the understanding, which, alongside 
imagination, constitutes the genius. Finally, poetry is the only art in which 
aesthetic ideas are in full power and can be fully expressed. This happens 
because language is pushed to its limits and is freed from conceptual 
constraints. 






In this dissertation, I will consider Kant’s hierarchy of the arts within his aesthetics and, 
especially, why poetry is ranked first among all arts. I will argue that poetry is the 
highest of all fine arts because it is made of language and this gives it a privileged 
relationship with the mind’s faculties and with nature. In the first section, I will argue that 
poetry possesses free beauty, contrary to other representational arts, and therefore pure 
judgments of taste in poetry are possible. Next, I will analyse the relationship between 
poetry and the genius, by explaining why poetry is the only art that originates entirely 
from the genius. In the third and last section, I will consider the relationship between 
poetry and aesthetic ideas, and I will contend that these ideas are in full power in poetry 
because of its linguistic nature. First, however, I will briefly introduce some points of 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, to clarify what will be treated in the next sections. 
 Kant’s aesthetics is extensively exposed in the first part of the Critique of 
Judgment (from now on referred as CJ), though some references can also be found in his 
works on anthropology. In the CJ, Kant considers judgments of taste, which are 
judgments on beautiful objects and in which feelings of pleasure/displeasure play a 
central role. Works of fine art can be the object of these judgments because they are 
beautiful representations of objects. Fine arts, or beautiful arts, are defined by Kant with 
three contrasts1. First, art differs from nature in being the product of an intentional 
action; second, the production of a work of art requires some practical skills and, lastly, 
art is free in the sense that is not “handicraft”, which is done for some external purposes, 
while art’s aim is only its pure enjoyment. Despite his treatment of fine art, it should be 
noted that Kant is more concerned with beauty in nature rather than beauty in art. In fact, 
he thinks that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature is always a mark of a 
good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of 
                                                      




mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associate itself with the 
contemplation of nature”2. Kant is interested in drawing connections between beauty and 
morality, therefore, the association between the appreciation of natural beauty and 
morality explains why he is more concerned with beauty in nature. On the other hand, he 
does not think that interest in the beautiful arts is a sign of a good soul. 
Kant introduces his hierarchy of the arts in section 51 of the CJ. Here, he divides 
fine arts into the art of speech, formative art and the art of the play of sensations. The 
arts of speech are poetry and rhetoric, formative arts are plastic art (sculpture and 
architecture) and painting and, finally, the third art is music. The distinction is based on 
the analogy between arts and modes of expression, which are word, gesture and tone. In 
section 53 of the CJ, Kant gives a hierarchy of the arts, with poetry at the top, followed 
by rhetoric, formative arts and music. In Lectures on Anthropology, he divides fine arts 
into material (painting and music) and spiritual arts (oratory and poetry) but the 
hierarchy does not change.  
                                                      
2 Kant I, CJ, p. 128 
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2 POETRY AND FREE BEAUTY 
 
2.1 
This section aims to argue that poetry possesses free beauty and that, therefore, pure 
judgments of taste in poetry are possible, as opposed to some other arts. Kant introduces 
the distinction between free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and adherent or dependent beauty 
(pulchritudo adherens) in section 16 of the CJ.  Free beauty in an object means that we do 
not consider any concepts, purposes, functions when we judge that object. Especially, we 
do not consider any concept of how the object ought to be, that is, any concept of 
perfection. With dependent beauty, instead, we are distracted in our judgments by 
conceptual considerations of the object. This means that we have a concept of perfection 
for the object and therefore we search for elements of perfection in it instead of purely 
contemplating it. Here our judgments depend not only on the pure contemplation of the 
object, but also on concepts, on our previous knowledge of the functions and purposes, and 
therefore are not pure. Moreover, in previous sections 13, 14 and 15, Kant maintains that 
charms and emotions, concepts and perfection make the judgments of taste impure. In fact, 
“a judgment of taste, therefore, is only pure so far as its determining ground is commingled 
with no merely empirical delight”3. A pure judgment of taste is not only free from 
conceptual deliberations but it must also be free from empirical delight, that is satisfaction 
only coming from the senses. Charms and emotions are elements of empirical delight, 
according to Kant. Charms are mere sensations and they are only agreeable thus they 
cannot be considered beautiful. Similarly, emotions are defined as sensations produced by 
“a momentary check”4. Therefore, judgments of taste must be independent of charms and 
emotions because otherwise, their delight would not be universal, given that it comes only 
from the senses, but he has previously demonstrated, in section 9, that the beautiful is that 
which pleases universally. Examples of charms are for Kant colours and tones: they can be 
pure, and therefore regarded as beautiful, only if their “uniformity is not disturbed or 
                                                      
3 Kant, I., CJ, p. 55 
4 Kant, I., CJ, p. 57 
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broken by any foreign sensation”5. This means that, for instance, colours should not 
distract the mind from what is essential, the design in figurative arts.  Instead, colours and 
tones are not pure when they are used to attract the mind to a further purpose than the pure 
representation of the object.  
An example of dependent beauty, therefore, could be a royal palace. Here, charms 
(i.e. colours, decorations) and the concept of perfection prevent us from a purely aesthetical 
consideration of it. This means that our judgments are influenced, for instance, by our 
knowledge of the history of royal palaces or of architecture. The mind is distracted by the 
brilliance of colours or by the intricacy of decorations and this makes the judgments unfree 
and thus impure. Moreover, the beauty of the palace may become an instrument for the 
purpose of the palace (i.e. to underline the magnificence and richness of the royals) instead 
of being the object of our aesthetic judgment.  
The distinction between free and dependent beauty can be very fluctuating. In fact, 
it is not easy to determine if there are concepts of perfection involved in our judgments of 
taste, while we are making them. The form in the representation of a beautiful object in 
itself does not give us any objective purposiveness (any concept of perfection) so 
everything depends on the subjective purposiveness in the mind of the observer. In section 
15, Kant gives an example:  
 
“For instance, if in a forest I light upon a plot of grass, round which trees stand in a circle, 
and if I do not then form any representation of an end, such as that it is meant to be used, 
say, for country danced, then not the least hint of a concept of perfection is given by the 
mere form”6. 
 
So, the beauty of the clearing and the trees offers no concept of perfection in itself, but this 
depends on the observer. However, it can be argued that, for Kant, the beauty of nature is 
free beauty. In fact, his first example of free beauties is flowers. Beauty in nature is free 
                                                      
5 Kant, I., CJ, p. 55 
6 Kant, I., CJ, p. 58 
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because it involves no concept of perfection. As Kant underlines7, few people (i.e. 
botanists, ornithologists) know the true nature, in the sense of how they ought to be, of 
natural objects, say, flowers and birds. Even those people, when judging the beauty of 
flowers and birds, do not consider any end, any idea of perfection. Therefore, beauty in 




It is more challenging to decide whether there can be free beauty in the arts. Indeed, it 
seems that there are concepts of perfection, at least in the creation of a work of art. The 
artist has rules and purposes while creating. However, in section 16 of the CJ, Kant 
includes among free beauties also "designs à la grecque, foliage for framework or on wall-
papers"8 and "what in music are called fantasias (without a theme), and, indeed, all music 
that is not set to words"9. Following these claims, it is usually accepted that there is free 
beauty in non-representational arts because there is no determinate concept to influence our 
judgment.  
It can also be argued that beautiful poems can also be free beauties. First, there are 
no charms in poetry. In fact, there are no colours and no ornaments to appeal the eye. 
Charms appeal to the senses and distract the mind from the pure contemplation. Ornaments 
in poetry (e.g. rhetorical devices) appeal directly to the imagination and not to the senses 
and therefore involve no empirical delight. Nevertheless, it should be considered that, for 
Kant, music is essential to poetry. In section Poesis as an art in the Lectures on 
Anthropology, Kant states that “the art of poetry coincides with music. For it also considers 
a measured tempo”10. Therefore, it may seem that there are charms for the ear, even in 
poetry, because it is connected to music. However, music in poetry regards rhythm rather 
than sounds and tones. Moreover, Kant adds that the syllabic meter has the only aim of 
                                                      
7 Kant I., CJ, p. 60 
8 Kant I., CJ, p. 60 
9 Kant I., CJ, p. 60 
10 Kant I., Lectures on Anthropology, p. 266 
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keeping the power of imagination strong and in motion. Therefore, music in poetry has no 
external, additional purpose but its aim is solely internal to poetry and its pure enjoyment. 
Hence poetry only appeals to the imagination and not to the senses. Besides, Kant does not 
allow emotions in poetry11, in the sense that poetry cannot cause only emotions in the 
reader. That kind of poetry would be bad poetry, without any true beauty in it. In fact, 
emotions are mere sensations that distract the mind from the pure enjoyment. Therefore, if 
poetry only causes emotions, here intended as momentary sensations, it cannot possess free 
beauty. However, according to Kant, poetry is more than a play of sensations because it is 
the art that moves the imagination and the understanding more. Therefore, poetry may 
cause feelings (i.e. a poem about death may cause a feeling of fear or sadness in the reader) 
but these are different from emotions, in the sense that they do not merely cause a 
momentary sensation. In addition, good poetry never only causes a feeling but its first and 
principal aim is to arouse the imagination and the understanding, not through emotions or 
feelings, but through ideas. It is more difficult to argue that there are no concepts of 
perfection in poetry. Kant insists on poetry being a matter of imagination as if it were a 
serious business of the understanding. This indicates that, for Kant, there are no 
determinate concepts of a further end in poetry. Moreover, by appealing directly to the 
imagination, poetry pleases immediately without any further representation or end, and this 
is another requirement for free beauty.  
One might object that poetry is a representational art and that therefore, it cannot 
possess free beauty. Descriptions in poetry, for example, can make it a representational art. 
Therefore, there would be a concept of perfection, a concept of how the object in poetry 
ought to be, that might influence our judgment on poetry, making it impure. First, it should 
be noted that Kant was somehow aware of the issue. In fact, in Lectures on Anthropology, 
he writes:  
 
“Why is the poet happier in fable that in truth? Because his aim is not to promote the 
understanding but he takes merely the imagination as his chief end. Truth sets limits for 
                                                      
11 See Kant I., Lectures on Anthropology, p. 437 
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him, and he does not love that at all […], e.g. poets are not happy in describing life, or if 
that is suitable, they mix a lot of untruth with it.”12 
 
This means that, for Kant, the best poetry is not the poetry that describes the phenomenal 
world, of which we can have a concept of perfection, given that we see the original. So, for 
example, he would not like the accurate description of a specific town in a poem, because 
we can see the original town and compare the two. According to Kant, it would be better to 
mix false elements with the truth, so that fewer concepts of perfection are involved. 
Moreover, he prefers poetry that adds invented elements because this makes the poet freer 
to engage more the imagination. So, Kant seems to favour poetry without descriptions or a 
focus on nature, instead preferring morality as the object of poetry. This could be one way 
to respond to the objection of poetry being a representational art. Moreover, it seems that 
Kant is more willing to give concessions on the concept of perfection in free beauty rather 
than on charms and emotions. As Wenzel points out, Kant’s primary interest is in drawing 
connections between beauty and morality and, because he sees elements of perfection in 
morality but not elements of charms or emotions, he is less concerned with the former. In 
conclusion, even if there are elements of representation in poetry, this does not mean that 
poetry cannot possess free beauty. In fact, when Kant talks of poetry as the highest art, he 
seems to refer to poetry that is not a truthful description of the phenomenal world. In this 
sense, poetry does not always represent something that we have already experienced and of 
which we already have a concept. Moreover, for Kant, there can be concepts of perfection 
in poetry, as long as charms and emotions are absent, because they are entirely foreign to 





                                                      




On the other hand, other arts are influenced by elements of charms and emotions and 
therefore do not possess free beauty. Formative arts and music are ranked below poetry 
because they possess elements of charms distracting the mind from the pure contemplation. 
In formative arts, colours are charms. In fact, as Kant states in section 14 of the CJ, the 
proper object of the judgment of taste in those arts is design. Therefore, colours are 
admitted only if their purpose is solely to ennoble the design. Otherwise, colours are 
distracting elements that appeal more to the senses (the eye) than to the imagination and 
that do not provide the mind with the sole contemplation of the object. So, for example, a 
composite, abundant group of colours in the depiction of a cape in a painting, provides an 
empirical delight for the eye but does not contribute to the beauty of the picture because it 
is not pure and not essential to the design. Moreover, when formative arts are 
representational, they, indeed, represent something. So, while judging them, we have a 
concept of how the object ought to be because we compare the represented object with the 
original one. Hence, our aesthetic judgments are influenced by other concepts and therefore 
are impure.  
Turning to music, Kant clearly states in section 16 of CJ that music without theme 
or words possesses free beauty. However, there can be elements of charm in music and 
they are tones (sounds). Music does not possess free beauty because it is too connected to 
sensations and, for Kant, free beauty must not involve mere empirical delight. In fact, in 
section 51 of CJ, music is defined as the “beautiful play of sensations (sensations that arise 
from external stimulation)”13. Therefore, music appeals to the faculties of imagination and 
understanding but through sensations rather than representations. Perhaps there are no 
concepts of perfection in music, but it seems to be a too empirical enjoyment to possess 
free beauty. Moreover, Kant is not sure if music can be called a fine art or a merely 
agreeable one. Besides, in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view, Kant gives a 
hierarchy of the senses: 
                                                      




“The sense of sight, even if it is not more indispensable than that of hearing, is still the 
noblest, because, among all the senses, it is furthest removed from the sense of touch […]. 
Thus sight comes nearer to being a pure intuition (the immediate representation of the 
given object, without admixture of noticeable sensation)”14.  
 
This hierarchy, as Penny in The highest of all arts: Kant and Poetry underlines, could 
explain why poetry and pictorial arts are ranked above the music: because the sense of 
sight is nobler and higher than the sense of hearing. Moreover, it was said above that 
poetry appeals directly to the imagination and not to the senses. Of course, poetry is also 
received through senses, especially vision but perhaps also hearing. However, first, sight is 
the noblest sense, close to pure intuition, so this helps in explaining why poetry is the 
highest art. Moreover, it has already been shown that it has no charms for the senses and 
allows for no mere empirical delight. Poetry, in fact, does not cause mere sensations but it 
immediately appeals to the imagination. It has no charms for the eye or the ear because all 


















                                                      
14 Kant I., Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. p. 48 
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3 POETRY AND THE GENIUS 
 
3.1 
The second section considers why poetry is the art that comes directly from the genius and 
how this is related to nature. In the arts, there is a tension between rules and freedom in the 
sense that the work of art should appear free and lawless but the artist, as highlighted in the 
previous section, has rules and aims while creating. About this apparent contradiction, 
Kant writes that  
 
“A product of fine art must be recognised to be art and not nature. Nevertheless, the 
purposiveness in its form must appear just as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as 
if it were a product of mere nature", therefore, "we must be able to look upon fine art as 
nature, although we recognise it to be art"15.  
 
This means that art and nature are interrelated in the sense that art must look like nature, 
that is, look as free as nature is from any rules. However, art is inevitably the product of 
intentions, rules and skills. To solve this paradox, Kant introduces the notion of genius, in 
the next section (46). Genius is defined as “the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through 
which nature gives the rules to art”16. First, it should be noted that the genius is an innate 
mental aptitude and this means it is a gift, an inborn talent that cannot be learned. So, the 
genius is an inspiration, not fully understood even by the subject who possesses it. This is 
why, for Kant, artists cannot explain in full the process of creation, where their ideas come 
from. Rules are given to art through genius so that every work of art is exemplary, in the 
sense that it exemplifies a new rule, and it is not the product of imitation or the mere 
following of rules. Kant says that it is nature that gives the rule to art through the genius. In 
this definition, nature is not intended as the nature surrounding us but is it something in the 
subject, the disposition of his/her faculties, in other words, it is the nature of the subject. 
                                                      
15 Kant I., CJ. p. 135 
16 Kant I. CJ, p. 136 
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Therefore, nature gives the rule to art in the sense that the faculties of the subject should be 
the only origin for works of art. The faculties involved in the genius are primarily the 
imagination and the understanding. Therefore, the genius as the source of fine arts means 
that fine arts are the product of the harmonious play of imagination and understanding. 
Turning to the relationship between poetry and genius, Kant affirms that poetry is 
the most exemplary art and it is the art that comes directly from the genius: “poetry, which 
owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least willing to be led by precepts or 
examples […]”17. Moreover, he often talks of poets, more than any other artist, as prophets, 
as inspired people. For instance, in Lectures on Anthropology, Kant talks of poetical 
inspiration as an involuntary state of mind, which sometimes occurs in the mind of poets. 
In Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, he writes that poets are considered as 
fortune-tellers because of their momentary inspiration. The reason why poetry is the art 
that almost entirely originates from genius lies in the intrinsic characteristics of poetry 
itself. In other words, poetry holds this privileged place among other arts because it is 
made of language. Because imagination and understanding ultimately constitute the genius, 




It has already been shown that poetry is the art least dependent on the senses. It is instead 
the art that appeals immediately to the imagination. Indeed, in section 53 of the CJ, Kant 
affirms that "it (poetry) expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination […]”18. 
Poetry, as well as other fine arts, free the imagination from cognitive constraints, in the 
sense that there cannot be a determinate concept of art. Moreover, poetical images are 
linguistic images that do not appeal to the senses but directly to the imagination. However, 
because they are linguistic images, they can also contain the “lawless freedom 
                                                      
17 Kant I., CJ. p. 155 
18 Kant I., CJ, p. 155 
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imagination”19 that, according to Kant, only brings to nonsense. Being made of language, 
poetry immediately recalls the understanding, whose judgments are also made of language, 
and, even if no determinate concept is involved, this can somehow “guide” the 
imagination. However, poetry’s linguistic images also express something to which no 
verbal expression is completely adequate and this also frees the imagination from the 
cognitive restrictions, as seen above. In other words, poetry frees imagination from the 
laws of association (used in the empirical employment of imagination) in the sense that 
imagination can take the material from empirical experience, from “nature”, in accordance 
with the laws but then work freely upon that material.  
Concerning the understanding, it should be first highlighted that poetry uses the 
same language of judgments of the understanding. This observation, which might look 
obvious, could nevertheless help in explaining why poetry only depends on the subject’s 
faculties and is not influenced by external elements. Poetry is the art “of conducting a free 
play of the imagination as if it were a serious business of the understanding”20. It is a 
serious business of the understanding because it shares the same language. This means that 
poetry can have the same content, can treat the same subjects of discursive reason. Indeed, 
Kant does not allow any mixture of philosophy and poetry21 but this proximity can explain 
the high rank of poetry. Moreover, poetry can also have morality as its subject. In fact, this 
happens quite often, and this seems to be the kind of poetry preferred by Kant. However, in 
treating these subjects, poetry is free from the inflexibility of the judgments of the 
understanding, because it does not involve, being a fine, free art, any determinate concept. 
Poetry is a pure play of ideas so this means, of course, that it cannot provide a judgment 
under a concept but it can arouse the understanding more than other arts because it treats 
the same subjects, with the same language. Therefore, Kant can state about poetry that “its 
avowed pursuit is merely one of play, which, however, understanding may turn to good 
                                                      
19 Kant I., CJ, p. 148 
20 Kant I., CJ. p. 149 
21 For a full discussion of the relationship between poetry and philosophy in Kant, see Barfield R., 
The ancient quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry 
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account and employ for its own purpose”22. On the one hand, poetry comes directly from 
the genius, that is, from the harmony between imagination and understanding because both 
faculties are perfectly at ease, are perfectly harmonious with the content and methods of 
poetry. On the other hand, and because of that, poetry can look like a serious business of 
the understanding because, even without determinate concepts, it still treats the same 
subjects of the understanding and therefore can be extremely thought-provoking. It is 
thought-provoking in the sense that it arouses the understanding, it somehow gives material 
to it, even if no understanding’s judgments are involved.  
Moreover, poetry is the most autonomous art, only coming from the nature of the 
subject, because its rules are entirely internal. Rules in poetry, regarding both rhythm and 
meter as well as the structure of a specific poetic form, generally come from tradition. 
Furthermore, poetry is also a play for play’s sake because it is aware of being a mere play 
and it declares it. This is also why, for Kant, poetry is not a deceptive art, contrary to 
rhetoric. Therefore, rules in poetry come from poetry itself, come from the nature of the 
subject, which is the only source of poetry. Instead, music, for example, takes its rules also 
from mathematics, not only from the genius. Formative arts, as well, take their rules from 
an external source: nature, for example, because they somehow imitate it. Poetry only takes 
its rules from its own tradition or from the genius, which is its only origin. Therefore, 




Given that also rhetoric is made of language, it should be explained why it is ranked below 
poetry. They both are, indeed, classified as arts of speech. However, rhetoric is defined as 
“the art of engaging a serious business of the understanding as if it were a free play of the 
imagination”23, which is the exact contrary of poetry’s definition. The orator promises a 
serious business of the understanding but then he/she conducts it as a mere play of ideas for 
                                                      
22 Kant I., CJ. p. 155 
23 Kant I., CJ. p. 149 
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the imagination. Thus, the rhetoric art is a deceptive art because its declared aim is not 
fulfilled. In fact, the orator promises a real engagement of the understanding but, being 
oratory a fine art, it cannot ultimately cause any understanding’s judgments but only a 
mere play of ideas, which can never be fully expressed. Poetry, on the other hand, does not 
promise anything and yet gives life to the understanding’s concepts through the 
imagination.  Once again, because poetry declares its being a mere play, it does not distract 
the mind with any other end that the pure enjoyment. Rhetoric, instead, promises a further 
end, that of the serious involvement of the understanding, therefore it is less free than 
poetry. Moreover, poetry has no purpose other than the free play of imagination and 
understanding whereas rhetoric has the aim of convincing the listener. So, one of the 
reasons why rhetoric is ranked below poetry is that it is not as free as poetry.  
Besides, the reason why rhetoric, despite its use of language, does not depend solely 
on the genius, is that it does not share a privileged relationship with the two faculties 
constituting the genius, namely, imagination and understanding. In fact, rhetoric uses 
linguistic images, as well as poetry, to charm the imagination with the purpose of 
convincing and deceive the understanding. It does not free the imagination from cognitive 
constraints because it aims to get to the understanding. On the other hand, it does recall 
determinate concepts in the understanding but charmed by the imagination. Moreover, 
because its aim is declared, namely to convince the listeners, the genius is not at its full 
powers because it still has some guidance, some constraints from rules and its own 
purpose. Instead, in poetry, the genius is utterly free from rules and aims. In conclusion, it 
seems that in rhetoric, the genius is not wholly free and powerful because the 
understanding is too much involved with its determined concepts, leaving little space for 









4 POETRY AND AESTHETIC IDEAS 
 
4.1 
Kant defines an aesthetic idea as “the representation of the imagination which evokes much 
thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being 
adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never quite fully capture or render 
completely intelligible”24. Aesthetic ideas are therefore representations of the imagination 
and they are the counterpart of rational ideas in the sense that, as no intuition can be 
completely adequate to rational ideas, no concept can be fully adequate to aesthetic ideas. 
Aesthetic ideas also mediate between rational ideas, on the one side, and imagination and 
sensibility on the other, in the sense that the work of art can give sensible form to subjects 
of rational ideas thanks to aesthetic ideas, which are the way to express those subjects. 
Thus, rational ideas provide the subject to poetry while aesthetic ideas are the mean to 
express that subject. Aesthetic ideas are helped in the presentation of the subject by 
aesthetic attributes. Aesthetic attributes are attributes that pertain to the object and they 
support aesthetic ideas, in the sense that they make the idea more vivid in our mind. They 
show further representations or implications connected with the presented concept, without 
constituting a proper presentation of another concept. Their role is to animate the mind 
even further, by stimulating the imagination with more representations and therefore 
provoking more thoughts. Kant here presents the famous example of Jupiter’s eagle to 
explain the role of the attributes. Similarly, the eagle is used by Dante Alighieri in the first 
canto of Paradise in the Divine Comedy, with the line “Aquila sì non gli s’affisse 
unquanco”25. Here the eagle stands for Beatrice, Dante's guide in Paradise. An eagle is an 
empirical object, but it is also an aesthetic attribute because it gives a further representation 
to the aesthetic idea. According to the Catholic tradition, the eagle is the only animal that 
can stare directly into the sun and so can Beatrice, with the sun representing God. Here, the 
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25 “When Beatrice towards the left-hand side/ I saw turned round, and gazing at the sun;/ Never 
did eagle fasten so upon it!” 
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aesthetic attribute not only clarifies the aesthetic idea (of the spiritual superiority of 
Beatrice) but it also adds representations and images (the sharpness of Beatrice’ eye, the 
splendour of the sun/God), one after the other, so that the mind is stimulated to think more 
about the idea and about all the interrelated representations and concepts, even if they 
cannot be fully grasped. Kant affirms that aesthetic attributes play an essential role in 
poetry (and rhetoric) because they are associated with logical attributes, which are the 
attributes that satisfy the concept applied to the object. They are associated in the sense 
that, in the example above, they allow to integrate the eagle with Beatrice. Logical 
attributes of the eagle are, for instance, the sharpness of its eyes, which is a concept 
associated with the eagle. Aesthetic attributes permit to think about the sharpness of 
Beatrice’s eyes not by reference to her but to the attributes of the eagle. In this way, 
Beatrice and the eagle are integrated, in the sense that the attribute of the eagle is 
transferred to Beatrice. Therefore, aesthetic attributes enliven the play between imagination 
and understanding by allowing the imagination to “bring more thought into play in the 
matter”26 in a way that such thought can somehow be formulated in language, and 
therefore, more accessible to the understanding. To explain this rather difficult interplay, 
Kant introduces some examples of poetry by King Frederick II of Prussia and P.L. Withof. 
So, for instance, in the description “The sun arose, as out of virtue rises peace”27, the rising 
of the sun is compared to the rising of virtue out of peace, evoking many happy, restful 
thoughts, even if we cannot express them under definite concepts, and, therefore, in the 
understanding’s judgments. The sensible (the dawn) is here used as an instrument for 
something that cannot be experienced by the senses (virtue and peace) and it helps us 
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In addition to the privileged role of aesthetic attributes in poetry, Kant also states that 
aesthetic ideas are in full power in poetry, in a twofold way. On the hand, Kant affirms that 
poetry can give a sensible form to invisible beings. On the other hand, poetry can also 
make us experience nature in a way that we do not experience empirically, by the senses. 
These two points will be now considered separately. Regarding the first point, Kant writes 
that  
 
“the poet essays the task of giving sensible form to the rational ideas of invisible beings, 
the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation and so forth.”28 
 
As Wenzel points out, it is difficult to visualise objects (“invisible beings”) such as 
morality (i.e. virtues, vices), God, freedom and so on. It is difficult to find an image or 
some representation for those kinds of objects. In fact, they are given to us as intuitions to 
which concepts are never fully adequate and onto which, therefore, the understanding 
cannot elaborate a judgment. However, poetry, as well as other arts, though at a lower 
level, can represent these objects through aesthetic ideas and attributes. For instance, so 
does Leopardi in his poem L’infinito, where he attempts to somehow give sensible form to, 
indeed, the infinite. The infinite is not a concept we can fully comprehend but it is more of 
a rational idea, to which no intuition is completely adequate. The language of the poem is a 
continuous play between nouns that indicate empirical objects, “spazi”, “silenzi”, “quiete” 
and adjectives that point to something beyond empirical experience, “interminati”, 
“sovrumani”, “profondissima”. In this situation, where empirical objects evoke something 
beyond empirical experience, the poet can render the sensations, the feelings, the thoughts 
in front of the infinite. Therefore, even if perhaps we still cannot visualise the infinite, we 
have a grasp of how it would be like to visualise it.  
The reason why poetry is the adequate art to permit the visualisation of such beings 
is, once again, that it is made of language. Indeed, in poetry, the imagination is free from 
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the constraints of the verbal expression and the aesthetic idea, which is a representation of 
the imagination, can be fully expressed. In fact, non-poetic language is not adequate to 
express those objects because it is conceptually determinate. In poetry, as some authors29 
commenting on this matter note, language is pushed to its limits and this is the only way to 
visualise those objects that involve no definite concept. Brodsky explains this matter by 
pointing to the fact that the use of language in poetry, even if it cannot represent an idea, 
because this is impossible within Kant’s general doctrine, it can indicate “our ability to 
think ideas”, in other words, to think about what we cannot represent in any language. 
Therefore, it is still language but pushed to its limits, to the maximum of its expression. For 
instance, in the poem by Leopardi examined above, there is an extreme tension in 
language, between empirical objects and super-sensible objects, as well as between the 
impossibility of thinking of the infinite and the poetic imagination that, through those 
empirical objects, allows us to have a grasp of the infinite. Moreover, Kant has already 
established that poetry, contrary to the rhetoric, is not deceptive because it is a manifest, 
pure play and its only aim is its enjoyment. Similarly, poetry is somehow aware of the 
inadequacy of its verbal expression, in the sense that poetry evokes so many thoughts 
which can never be fully grasped but can give occupations to the understanding. The 
awareness of the inadequacy of the verbal discourse, together with the fact that this is still 
the only way to somehow approximate to ideas, make poetry a pure play, a play of 





Turning to the second point, that is how poetry makes us experience nature beyond what 
we experience empirically, Kant says in section 53 of the CJ that:  
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genesis of what we lack: “Schema”, “Poetry” and the “Monogram of the Imagination” in Kant 
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“it (poetry) invigorates the mind by letting it feel its faculty – free, spontaneous, and 
independent of determination by nature – of regarding and judging nature as phenomenon 
in the light of aspects which nature of itself does not afford us in experience, either for the 
senses or the understanding, and of employing it accordingly on behalf of, and as a sort of 
schema for, the supersensible”30.  
 
Poetry allows the mind to “regard” and “judge” nature of the unfree phenomenal world as 
if it were a schema for the supersensible, which is something beyond senses. Though we 
usually experience nature through senses, poetry allows us to get to aspects of nature 
beyond empirically-experienced nature. Elsewhere, Kant also affirms that the genius can 
create another nature, in the sense that it is a productive faculty. So, all of this means that 
the genius, through aesthetic ideas and, therefore, imagination, can use the material from 
nature and turn it into something new, which is new because elements from nature are 
combined in a new, unprecedented way. On the one hand, poetry allows the mind to treat 
nature as a phenomenon, which is quite straightforward, but in a way that we cannot 
experience empirically, through senses. On the other hand, nature serves as “a sort of 
schema for the supersensible”. Now a schema, in Kant’s theory, is a rule by which one of 
the understanding’s categories is associated with a sense-impression. Therefore, nature in 
poetry can mediate between sense-impressions and the supersensible and, in this way, we 
can get at aspects of the phenomenal world beyond what we can experience in nature itself. 
It is difficult to exactly explain how we can better understand nature by going beyond 
nature through poetry. Kant himself does not give much explanation on this. However, I 
shall try to explain how nature can act as a schema in poetry.  
A schema is a rule that connects two realms that are not connected. Here nature 
connects the unfree phenomenal world and the free world of the supersensible, or of 
imagination as a productive faculty. This happens in poetry because poetry uses language 
in a free way. Poetry, in fact, uses the very same language that is usually conceptually 
determinate, therefore not free, without determinate concepts, therefore in a free way. 
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Poetry does not need specific concepts, because it can arouse the understanding but without 
its concepts. So, the art of poetry can freely talk about the unfree phenomenal world of 
nature because its own mean of expression, usually unfree, is here freed. In this way, the 
mind is free to expand the representations of nature itself through that very nature, whose 
expression is freed by poetic language. Nature in poetry, hence, serves as a schema for the 
supersensible because it is presented by language in a free way, meaning under no 
determinate concepts. Both language and nature, therefore, in poetry are freed: language is 
freed from conceptual determinations and animated by aesthetic attributes. Nature is free 
because it is not merely described but it stands for something else. So, in the examples 
above, the eagle (an object of nature) stands for Beatrice. In Leopardi’s poem, the silence, 
which we can experience through senses, stands for the infinite, which we cannot 
empirically experience. Poetry, therefore, attempts to make us visualise the free realm of 
the supersensible through nature, which becomes an instrument (a schema), instead of 
being the mere object of poetry.  
An example of a poem can help in further explaining this difficult issue. Take the 
last line of the Paradise by Dante Alighieri: L'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle31. Here, 
there are the concepts of love, sun, stars, which all are part of the phenomenal world. 
However, love represents God. God, according to Kant, is an idea, because we can never 
have a fully adequate concept for it. Therefore, as exemplified above, the attributes of love 
are also transferred to God. Moreover, here the language is free because if we interpret this 
line as an understanding's judgments, meaning under definite concepts, it makes no sense 
because love cannot move the sun. Poetical language, freed from the inadequacy of verbal 
expression, allows us to understand what it is being said: God is essentially love and is the 
reason and grounding of everything. Therefore, here nature (love, sun, stars) stands for 
something else (the ideas of God and the whole world) and in this way, we understand 
something more about nature, that its foundation is God. Nature, in poetry, is thus a 
schema for the supersensible (here God), connecting the unfree phenomenal world with the 
                                                      




realm of ideas. This example explains why poetry, being made of language, is the art that, 
more than any others, allows us to grasp something about nature, beyond what we can 




An objection to the centrality of language in the relationship between poetry and aesthetic 
ideas comes from Hlobil, in his article Immanuel Kant on language and poetry: poetry 
without language. His point is that there is no connection between schema and language. 
According to him, the language in Kant is strictly connected with concepts. Kant treats 
schema only as entities of consciousness (intuition and representation) and not of language. 
Poetry is obviously made of language but the language itself is not able to exhibit aesthetic 
ideas because these ideas do not correspond to any concept and thus poetry is not able 
either. The language of poetry is not able to exhibit aesthetic ideas, intended as the many 
representations related to a particular concept. In conclusion, poetry for Kant is not really 
an art of language because language is not able to exhibit aesthetic ideas. Given that 
poetry’s purpose is to exhibit aesthetic ideas, then poetry must exceed language.  
It is true that Kant’s writings on the relationship between poetry, language and 
aesthetic ideas are sometimes ambiguous. Indeed, he maintains that language cannot 
“render completely intelligible” an aesthetic idea, because no concept is adequate to it. 
However, the aim of poetry is not to make the ideas completely intelligible, because its 
purpose is to give the understanding food, that is thoughts, and not a specific concept. 
Determinate concepts of the understanding allow it to produce a judgment, by placing the 
concept under a universal category. On the other hand, this is not the aim of art, which does 
not produce an understanding's judgments but produces the harmony between imagination 
and understanding, from which the judgment of taste originates. Moreover, Kant knows 
that conceptually determined language cannot be the language of poetry. The language of 
poetry is free in the sense that, indeed, it is not conceptually determined, because it is not 
made of the understanding’s judgments, as it is, say, science, and it cannot be placed under 
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the categories because it would make no sense. For example, the eagle standing for 
Beatrice cannot be placed under any Kantian category of relation. Therefore, even if the 
eagle in the poem is a concept, it is not determined because it cannot be placed under a 
category and no understanding’s judgments can be produced. Thus, poetry exceeds 
language only in the sense that poetic language itself exceeds conceptually determined 
expression. Poetry is an art of language, in fact, it is the art of language because it is the 
only art that can give so many thoughts to the understanding, by using its same, though 
freed, language.  
Furthermore, the proximity of language with concepts makes us understand better 
why aesthetic ideas are in full power in poetry. In fact, aesthetic attributes work in poetry 
by recalling more and more representations to the mind. So does language, which, thanks 
to its connection with concepts, recalls concepts other than the one expressed but, being 
freed from the rules of discursive reason, it does not recall a determinate concept. Because 
the mechanism of language and aesthetic attributes in poetry is similar, though on different 
levels, language explains the power of poetry in recalling more and more representations 
























In this dissertation, I have tried to explain why poetry is ranked as the highest among all 
arts and what similarities beauty in poetry bears with beauty in nature. I showed that 
poetry, as well as nature, possesses free beauty, contrary to other arts. Poetry is, in fact, 
free from charms, emotions and, at least up to a certain point, from concepts of 
perfection. Given that Kant ranks natural beauty above beauty in the arts, because of its 
being a sign of a good soul, the fact that poetry possesses free beauty, just like nature, 
can explain why it is the highest art. Besides, poetry is the art that descends directly from 
the genius, meaning that it only originates from the harmonious play between 
imagination and understanding, in other words, from the nature of the subject. Here 
again, poetry takes its rules only from nature, whereas other disciplines or rules 
influence other arts. I contended that poetry comes directly from the genius because it is 
made of language, which appeals directly to the imagination, not to the senses, and 
which is the language of understanding. This helps us in understanding why poetry only 
comes from the harmony between the subject’s faculties. Finally, I showed that poetry is 
the adequate art to express aesthetic ideas at their full power. This is possible because 
nature acts as a schema in poetry, in the sense that it connects the unfree phenomenal 
world with the free realm of the super-sensible, thanks to poetic language, which in turn 
is freed from its usual laws. Therefore, both nature and language, though they usually are 
unfree, are freed by poetry, and this allows poetry to express aesthetic ideas to their full 
power. In conclusion, poetry is the highest art because it is made of language and this 
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